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INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE MASSES 
JESSICA BODACK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The number of international courts, tribunals, and commissions 
has increased dramatically in the past few decades.  This increase can 
be explained in part by the economic globalization resulting from the 
end of the Cold War and by the emergence of non-state actors as par-
ties with the requisite standing to appear as claimants in international 
judicial forums.  Claims reparations tribunals, in particular, are evi-
dence of this relatively new position of prominence for individuals 
and corporations.  This phenomenon will be explored in more detail 
by looking at two claims reparations tribunals to see how they oper-
ate, what criticisms are advanced against them, and which characteris-
tics are their strongest attributes.  Through an examination of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Tribunal or Iran-U.S. Tribunal) 
and the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC or 
Commission), this Note concludes that the most successful elements 
of these international dispute settlement bodies are borrowed from 
the arbitral model and that future forums would benefit from adopt-
ing those proven characteristics. 
II.  THE EXPANSION OF  
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The origins of modern international dispute settlement began 
with the Permanent Court of Arbitration which was established by 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.1  Though the Permanent 
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Court of Arbitration is neither permanent nor a court,2 “its establish-
ment marked an important moment as the first standing international 
adjudicatory body.”3  This judicial body was the first global mecha-
nism for the settlement of international disputes.4 
Today, more than twenty international courts, tribunals, and 
commissions exist as permanent institutions and at least seventy other 
international institutions exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.5  
In the past few decades, the international arena has seen the estab-
lishment of trade and investment tribunals, mass claims reparations 
tribunals, regional economic integration tribunals, human rights tri-
bunals, a law of the sea tribunal, two new United Nations criminal tri-
bunals, and an international criminal court.6  This proliferation of in-
ternational adjudicatory bodies is the result of two interrelated 
developments: increased economic globalization since the end of the 
Cold War and the expansion of international law to address issues 
concerning non-state actors. 
The end of the Cold War was a catalyst which launched the 
world’s transition out of its existing bipolar framework and into the 
multilateral one that has developed today.7  International trade in-
creased between nations and subsequently a need arose for interna-
tional law forums to govern the inevitable disputes arising from the 
increased number of global transactions.8  Business and trade barriers 
were lowered among states in order to foster economic efficiency and 
growth as free trade doctrines and the market-economy paradigm tri-
umphed.9  More international judicial bodies were established in the 
1990s than in any other decade, due in large part to the systematic 
 
 2. The Permanent Court of Arbitration consists of a large panel of arbitrators appointed 
by state parties to the Hague Convention.  Should state parties agree to take a dispute to arbi-
tration, they may choose their arbitrators from this panel.  Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: International 
Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 160, 165 (2000). 
 5. About PICT, PROJECT INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS, at http://www.pict-pcti.org/about/ 
about.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2004). 
 6. Alford, supra note 4, at 160. 
 7. Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of 
the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709, 729 (1999). 
 8. See id. at 735 (the building of regional free trade areas brought about the creation of 
judicial bodies to settle disputes arising out of implementation of agreements, to uphold the re-
gime’s law, to ensure constant interpretation of the agreements, and to guarantee continuous 
access to legal remedies for members). 
 9. Id. 
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transformation of international relations following the demise of the 
Soviet Union.10 
In addition to creating the need for judicial bodies to adjudicate 
international disputes of the new multilateral world, “the post-Cold 
War acceleration of the globalization of commerce and telecommuni-
cations . . .  [decentralized] international law (i.e. [removed] it from an 
exclusively state platform) and [widened] the community of those af-
fected by international law, needing international law, and developing 
international law.”11  This introduction of non-state actors into the in-
ternational legal system was the second driving force behind the in-
crease of international courts, tribunals, and commissions. 
Traditionally, international legal personality was only vested in 
states.12  “[I]ndividuals and corporate entities were not ‘legal actors’ 
on the international plane,” so any “grievances [needed to] . . .  be es-
poused by a government for the claim to acquire the requisite stand-
ing before an international tribunal.”13  With the advent of human 
rights law though, there has been a renewed focus on the rights of in-
dividuals with regard to state conduct.14  “Modern public international 
law recognizes that individuals, irrespective of their nationality, have 
certain basic human rights and that states are responsible for respect-
ing and protecting those rights.”15  State responsibility now extends to 
ensure that individuals have an enforcement mechanism against who-
ever violates their rights, even another state. 
This expansion of international law to address the rights of non-
state actors, most notably through international trade and human 
rights law, has called into question the historic doctrine that only 
states have the international legal personality necessary to appear be-
fore international courts.16  “[P]rivate actors, whether they be victims 
of human rights abuses . . . or multinational corporations, . . . now 
have hugely raised expectations as to their rights, and responsibilities, 
under international law.”17  These expectations have caused both in-
dividuals and corporate entities to put pressure on state and intergov-
 
 10. Id. at 729. 
 11. Lucy Reed, Great Expectations: Where Does the Proliferation of International Dispute 
Resolution Tribunals Leave International Law?, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 219, 221 (2002). 
 12. Alford, supra note 4, at 162. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Reed, supra note 11, at 222. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Alford, supra note 4, at 162. 
 17. Reed, supra note 11, at 220. 
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ernmental organizations to recognize and to enforce their interna-
tional rights the same way that their domestic rights are enforced.18  
Today, non-state actors are achieving that recognition and enforce-
ment with the capacity to sue and to be sued before numerous inter-
national judicial bodies.19 
One of the most significant consequences of this proliferation of 
international judicial forums is an increase in the body of interna-
tional law.  “International courts and tribunals regularly render judi-
cial decisions that are creating basic source material for international 
law.”20  Because more international issues are being decided pursuant 
to international law, the body of authoritative decisions based on in-
ternational law is growing.21  Furthermore, the decisions of these in-
ternational courts are relied upon by other international courts.22 
Despite the fact that the current grouping of international courts 
is not organized in a hierarchy underneath the ICJ,23 “the variety of 
international tribunals functioning today do not appear to pose a 
threat to the coherence of an international legal system.”24  In fact, the 
courts and tribunals involved in international dispute settlement are 
not only cooperating with each other, but are displaying characteris-
tics of a network.25  “As a whole, the other forums complement the 
work of the ICJ and strengthen the system of international law, not-
withstanding the risk of some loss of uniformity.”26 
These new international courts, tribunals, and commissions, op-
erating individually, are working in concert to further the role of in-
ternational law in the world today.  Their decisions are expanding the 
body of international law, and they are enforcing the rights of non-
state actors in the international arena.  Therefore, it becomes ex-
tremely important to understand how these judicial bodies operate, 
who the judicial decision makers are, and where their strengths and 
 
 18. Id. at 221. 
 19. See id. (private and public actors are achieving recognition, enforcement and expansion 
of international rights in the proliferation of international judicial bodies); Alford, supra note 4, 
at 162 (individuals and corporate entities have standing in international courts and tribunals). 
 20. Alford, supra note 4, at 160. 
 21. Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of 
International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 704 (1999). 
 22. Alford, supra note 4, at 161. 
 23. Charney, supra note 21, at 698. 
 24. Id. at 700. 
 25. Anne Peters, International Dispute Settlement: A Network of Cooperational Duties, 14 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2003). 
 26. Charney, supra note 21, at 704. 
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weaknesses lie.  Ultimately, it will be up to the international commu-
nity to learn from those weaknesses and transform them into lessons 
for the future of judicial dispute resolution in international law. 
III.  CLAIMS REPARATIONS  
TRIBUNALS: COMPENSATING INDIVIDUALS 
Of the myriad of new courts, tribunals, and commissions that 
have emerged recently, claims reparations tribunals illustrate the 
growing importance of individuals and other non-state actors in in-
ternational law.  The notion of one country paying reparations to an-
other is not new,27 but it is significant that a country would choose to 
pay reparations through a claims tribunal instead of a one-time lump 
sum payment.  Lump sum payments are paid from one government to 
the other and individual claims are not considered until much later in 
the process,28 while international claims tribunals afford recognition 
directly to individual claimants.29  This recognition is an acknowledg-
ment that non-state actors have been injured in an international con-
flict and that they are entitled to compensation.  This does not mean, 
of course, that individuals, corporations, and international organiza-
tions did not go unharmed in international conflicts previous to the 
expansion of international law to include non-state actors, but it is 
only after this expansion that their claims are afforded the right to be 
adjudicated before an international judicial body.30 
 
 27. See Howard M. Holtzmann, Mass Claims Processes, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 69, 74 
(2002) (mass claims processes have been a useful way to provide compensation). 
 28. Even if the money is distributed through a domestic claims commission, “prospective 
claimants rarely [receive] the adjudicated value of their claims, muchless the amount they ini-
tially sought.”  David J. Bederman, The Glorious Past and Uncertain Future of International 
Claims Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 161, 169 
(Mark W. Janis ed., 1992). 
 29. In the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, for example, individual claimants may present their 
claims to the Tribunal directly in accordance with Article III(3) of the Claims Settlement Decla-
ration: “Claims of nationals of the United States and Iran that are within the scope of this 
Agreement shall be presented to the Tribunal either by claimants themselves or, in the case of 
claims of less than $250,000, by the government of such national.”  Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims 
by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), Jan. 19, 1981, U.S.-Iran, art. III(3), available at 
http://www.iusct.org/claims-settlement.pdf [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration].  For 
more information about the United Nations Compensation Commission’s focus on individual 
claimants, see infra, Part III(B). 
 30. For example, the United Nations Compensation Commission, established in 1991, was 
in the unique position, as compared to the claims tribunals following the Napoleonic Wars or 
either of the two World Wars, to be able to award claims on behalf of non-state actors. 
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In this brief examination of claims tribunals and their place 
within the proliferation of international judicial bodies, this Note 
highlights the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the United Nations 
Compensation Commission.  While these two international claims 
tribunals are quite different in their origin, their structure, and their 
operation, they both borrow extensively from the arbitral model and 
it is these characteristics that have proven to be their most successful 
and effective attributes. 
A. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was established in 1981 as one of 
the measures taken to resolve the crisis between the Islamic Republic 
of Iran and the United States of America.31  The diplomatic crisis, 
which began on November 4, 1979 when fifty-two United States na-
tionals were detained at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, was furthered 
when the United States subsequently froze all Iranian assets in the 
United States and in the hands of persons subject to U.S. jurisdic-
tion.32  The hostage crisis led to an almost complete severance of com-
mercial relationships, and many U.S. nationals had contracts that 
were cancelled and property which was expropriated.33  Claimants 
moved quickly and by 1980, more than 400 actions had been filed in 
U.S. courts against Iran.34  Perhaps Iran’s greatest incentive to resolve 
the crisis to the satisfaction of both countries was that it faced the 
 
Indeed, when the UN Security Council decided in the aftermath of the 1990-91 Kuwait 
crisis to establish a mechanism to deal with the issue of reparations for war dam-
ages . . .  it did not built upon a clean slate.  A long tradition of international claims 
practice offered sound foundations for this process.  Yet the context was deeply differ-
ent and unprecedented: the Cold War had just terminated, giving the UN a unique op-
portunity for innovation.  Unlike in 1815, 1918, or 1945 when non-state actors still 
played a marginal role in international society, in 1991 individuals (and even stateless 
persons), non-governmental organizations, corporations and intergovernmental or-
ganizations could, for the first time in history, become beneficiaries of the process 
along sovereign states. 
Cesare P.R. Romano, Woe to the Vanquished?  A Comparison of the Reparations Process after 
World War I (1914-18) and the Gulf War (1990-91), 2 AUS. REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 361, 362 
(1997). 
 31. Background Information: Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, IRAN-US CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL, at http://www.iusct.org/background-english.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2004). 
 32. Charles N. Brower, The Lessons of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Applied to Claims 
Against Iraq, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 15, 15 (Richard B. Lillich 
ed., 1995). 
 33. WAYNE MAPP, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, THE FIRST TEN YEARS 
1981-1991: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL’S JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 7 (1993). 
 34. Id. 
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prospect of its frozen assets being used to satisfy the U.S. claims.35  Fi-
nally, in January 1981, with Algeria acting as an intermediary be-
tween the two nations, each country’s respective commitment to end 
the crisis through a process of binding arbitration was recorded in the 
General Declaration36 and the Claims Settlement Declaration.37 
Arbitration has long been a favorite mechanism to settle dis-
putes, but traditionally, long before the widespread use of arbitration 
to settle private commercial disputes, this form of dispute resolution 
was reserved only for state parties.38  Though Iran and the United 
States would clearly have claims against each other, both countries 
understood that individuals and other non-state actors had been in-
jured and needed to be compensated as well.  In light of this, the Tri-
bunal has jurisdiction over three types of cases.  First, it can hear 
 
 35. Id. 
 36.  
It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of and pursuant to the provi-
sions of the two Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Re-
public of Algeria, to terminate all litigation as between the government of each party 
and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of all 
such claims through binding arbitration.  Through the procedures provided in the Dec-
larations relating to the Claims Settlement Agreement, the United States agrees to 
terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United 
States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all at-
tachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on 
such claims and to bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitra-
tion. 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (General 
Declaration), Jan. 19, 1981, U.S.-Iran, General Principle B, available at http://www.iusct.org/ 
general-declaration.pdf. 
 37. Background Information: Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, supra note 31. 
An international arbitral tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby 
established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States against 
Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim 
which arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the 
subject matter of that national’s claim, if such claims and counterclaims are out-
standing on the date of this Agreement, whether or not filed with any court, and arise 
out of debts, contracts (including transactions which are the subject of letters of credit 
or bank guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting property rights, ex-
cluding claims described in Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of the Government of Al-
geria of January 19, 1981, and claims arising out of the actions of the United States in 
response to the conduct described in such paragraph, and excluding claims arising un-
der a binding contract between the parties specifically providing that any disputes 
thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts, in re-
sponse to the Majlis position. 
Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 29, at art. II(1). 
 38. See J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 112 (3d ed. 1998) (“The 
distinction between inter-state and private arbitration is clear enough when we compare the 
traditional procedure for resolving disputes between states on the one hand, with the newer way 
of using arbitration to settle disputes between private individuals or corporations on the 
other.”). 
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claims of United States nationals against Iran and claims of Iranian 
nationals against the United States.39  Second, it can hear official 
claims of the two nations against each other.40  Lastly, it can hear in-
terpretive disputes relating to the application of the General Declara-
tion and the Claims Settlement Declaration.41  The United States and 
Iran thus adopted an arbitral process known as “mixed arbitration,” 
which is used to resolve disputes between states and private parties.42  
This process, as opposed to traditional inter-state arbitration, would 
ensure that all claims could be heard and adjudicated by the Tribunal. 
The Iran-U.S. Tribunal evidences a growing trend in interna-
tional law that procedures, and even entire institutions, can be tai-
lored specifically to each ad hoc situation.  “The development of pro-
cedures for resolving disputes between states and private bodies 
highlights the way in which supply can be adapted to meet demand in 
the field of dispute settlement.”43  The Tribunal is an acknowledgment 
of both this procedural flexibility and the need to provide forums for 
dispute resolution involving non-state actors. 
Some aspects of the Iran-U.S. Tribunal are characteristic of judi-
cial settlement,44 but the specificity of the Tribunal places it within an 
arbitral framework.  “Judicial settlement involves the reference of a 
dispute to the International Court or some other standing tribunal, 
such as the European Court of Human Rights.  Arbitration, in con-
trast, requires the parties themselves to set up the machinery to han-
dle a dispute, or series of disputes, between them.”45  Because the 
Iran-U.S. Tribunal was set up by the parties solely for the purpose of 
resolving claims arising from their dispute, the Tribunal falls within 
the arbitral model.  The Tribunal’s similarities to arbitration appear 
most strongly by examining the role of the Tribunal’s judicial decision 
makers, the judges. 
 
 39. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 29, at art. II(1). 
 40. Id. at art. II(2). 
 41. Id. at art. II(3). 
 42. Peters, supra note 25, at 7–8. 
 43. MERRILLS, supra note 38, at 114. 
 44. “[T]he Tribunal has ‘judges’, indeed, it has a stable cadre of these judges, it sits in one 
place, the Hague, it publishes its decisions, as any proper court should do, and no doubt over the 
years it has developed a set of procedures, modes of proof and terms of substantive jurispru-
dence well known to the bar that practices before it.”  Richard W. Hulbert, The International 
Commercial Arbitration Model and Public International Law Disputes, 8 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 501, 501–02 (2002). 
 45. MERRILLS, supra note 38, at 88. 
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The Tribunal consisted of nine judges at a time.46  Iran and the 
United States each appointed three of the judges and the remaining 
third were appointed by those six government appointed judges.47  
Panels are composed by the President and consist of three judges: one 
Iranian judge, one U.S. judge, and one third-country judge.48  These 
third-country judges have come from Poland, Italy, Finland, France, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and Argentina.49  
The cases are distributed to the panels by lot, but the full Tribunal 
decides all disputes between the two governments and other impor-
tant cases as determined by the President.50  The Tribunal Rules of 
Procedure, based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, include a 
mandatory disclosure for all judges of any circumstances likely to give 
rise to doubts about his or her impartiality or independence, as well 
as procedures by which parties can challenge the independence or 
impartiality of any judge.51 
These rules illustrate the government parties’ involvement in the 
Tribunal, similar to how the parties in an arbitration are deeply in-
volved in the process of selecting arbitrators.  In fact, it is this charac-
teristic of arbitration that some view as the most important.  “[T]he 
right of the parties to choose their own judges has always been, and 
remains to this day, the distinguishing feature of international arbitra-
tion.”52  The binding award from arbitration has more legitimacy, and 
is more likely to be accepted by the state parties, if they appointed the 
decision makers.  “[I]f governments are to be persuaded to refer dis-
putes to third parties they must have confidence in those who are to 
give the decision.”53 
Furthermore, the procedural aspects of the Tribunal also parallel 
arbitration.  First, the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedures are based on 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which allow for a considerable 
 
 46. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 29, at art. III(1). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Email from Erlien Reinders, Administrative Officer, Iran-United States Claims Tribu-
nal, to Jessica Bodack, Student, Duke University School of Law (Nov. 11, 2004, 07:35 EST) 
[hereinafter Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Members] (on file with author). 
 50. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 29, at art. III(1); Background Information: 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, supra note 31. 
 51. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Rules of Procedure, May 3, 1983, arts. 9–12, avail-
able at http://www.iusct.org/tribunal-rules.pdf. 
 52. D.H.N. Johnson, The Constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 152, 
165 (1953). 
 53. MERRILLS, supra note 38, at 116. 
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amount of flexibility based on the Tribunal’s actual operations.54  Ad-
ditionally, the Tribunal has quite a bit of latitude in determining the 
applicable law.55  This latitude is also a common characteristic of arbi-
tration where “[i]f the parties wish to increase the arbitrator’s free-
dom . . . , they can authorize him to take into account what is fair and 
reasonable, as well as the rules of international or municipal law.”56  
The flexibility of the arbitral procedure allowed the parties and the 
Tribunal to create the most effective forum possible. 
Another important object of comparison between the Tribunal 
and the arbitral process is the issue of the finality of the award.  “An 
arbitral award is binding, but not necessarily final.  For it may be 
open to the parties to take further proceedings to interpret, revise, 
rectify, appeal from or nullify the decision.”57  The Tribunal’s deci-
sions, however, are final and binding.58  This lack of any appeal 
mechanism could be criticized as creating a power imbalance since 
the judges’ decisions immediately become final and binding interna-
tional law. 
Of course, the Tribunal is subject to other criticisms as well.  De-
spite the advantages of keeping parties involved in the process of set-
ting up and overseeing the judicial body which will adjudicate their 
disputes, some have argued that Iran and the United States were too 
involved and had too much power to influence the Tribunal’s ac-
tions.59  Although this power legitimized the Tribunal’s actions to 
 
 54. “Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed and the Tribunal shall conduct its busi-
ness in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extent modified by the Parties or by the Tribunal 
to ensure that this Agreement can be carried out.” Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 
29, at art III(2). 
 55. See id. at art. V (“The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, ap-
plying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribu-
nal determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade, contract provi-
sions and changed circumstances.”).  See also Bederman, supra note 28, at 176 (“The Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal has interpreted [Article 5 of the Claims Settlement Declaration] to give it ex-
traordinary latitude in choosing among different sources of law, including that specified in an 
applicable contract, a municipal legal system selected by choice of law rules, the general princi-
ples of international commercial usage (the lex mercatoria), or principles of public international 
law.”). 
 56. MERRILLS, supra note 38, at 101. 
 57. Id. at 105. 
 58. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 29, at art. IV(1). 
 59.  
Unlike some other tribunals, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was not imposed by a vic-
tor on a vanquished.  Thus, one government could not dictate the procedures or 
schedule.  Because of the relatively equal bargaining position between Iran and the 
United States, the establishment of the Tribunal, selection of third country arbitrators 
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some degree,60 the parties were able to abuse that power, most nota-
bly to cause delays in the Tribunal’s operations.  For example, Iran 
frequently forced its arbitrators to resign, a common tactic used by 
parties in an arbitration to delay proceedings.61 
Delays were also an indirect result of the way the Tribunal was 
set up and the fact that the judicial decision-making body was a small 
community of only nine judges at a time.  When the same people 
work closely together on a daily basis in a restricted environment, the 
“small town syndrome” can occur.62  “[T]he more people are thrown 
together on a constant basis, the more they must take each other’s 
conduct into account, and the more susceptible they are to trade-
offs.”63  As time went on, there was a natural tendency on the part of 
third-country judges to compromise more and to find ways to “say 
yes” to Iran.64  Though this tendency usually happens at first in seem-
ingly harmless procedural decisions, pressures eventually increase to 
grant tradeoffs in substantive matters.65  “This is at least part of the 
explanation, for example, for the endless extensions of time granted 
to Iranian parties to complete their pleadings or respond to the plead-
ings of others.”66  The Tribunal’s small community created an envi-
ronment where personal relationships evolved to the point of possibly 
impeding the judges’ impartiality. 
Overall though, the Tribunal must be characterized as a success.  
First, the Tribunal accomplished exactly what it was supposed to do: 
it was a mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes.67  Not only 
was the diplomatic crisis of 1979-1981 diffused, but future interna-
tional relations between the United States and Iran were salvaged.  
“One wonders whether the United States would be able to make dip-
 
and promulgation of rules and procedures could be expected to be somewhat time-
consuming and not necessarily efficient.  Indeed, as relations between the United 
States and Iranian governments remained frigid, it would not be easy for them to come 
to agreement.  Moreover, as is customary with defendants in any proceeding, Iran had 
little incentive to acquiesce in procedures that would expedite claims—at least the pri-
vate claims (those brought by nationals of the State)— most of which were against it. 
Richard M. Mosk, The Pace of the Proceedings, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION 201, 202–03 (David 
D. Caron & John R. Crook eds., 2000). 
 60. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 61. Peters, supra note 25, at 24. 
 62. Brower, supra note 32, at 18. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 19. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Alford, supra note 4, at 164. 
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lomatic overtures to Iran today if U.S. nationals had never seen a 
measure of economic justice.”68  Additionally, in terms of pure num-
bers, the Tribunal successfully settled over 3,000 cases and over $2 
billion was paid to claimants.69  Lastly, “[t]he Tribunal has been a 
grand success and in no small part because of the quality of the judges 
who have served it.”70  Thirty individuals have served as judges since 
1981,71 and each of them contributed elements of professionalism and 
integrity to the Tribunal’s success. 
The Iran-U.S. Tribunal is a unique institution, both in its man-
date and its structure.  The Tribunal’s very establishment points to 
the elevated status of non-state actors in the international arena, and 
the involvement of the two state parties in its creation and operation 
legitimized the Tribunal’s decisions.  Furthermore, the adjudicatory 
process used by the Tribunal reflects the flexibility and adaptability of 
the arbitral model in resolving complex disputes in international law. 
B. United Nations Compensation Commission 
The United Nations Compensation Commission was established 
by the U.N. Security Council in 1991 following Iraq’s invasion and oc-
cupation of Kuwait.72  The UNCC’s charter to process claims and pay 
compensation for losses resulting from the first Gulf War was set out 
in paragraphs 16 and 18 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687: 
16. [The Security Council] . . . [r]eaffirms that Iraq . . . is liable un-
der international law for any direct loss, damage, including envi-
ronmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury 
to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of 
Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;73 
18. [The Security Council] . . . [d]ecides also to create a fund to pay 
compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to 
establish a Commission that will administer the fund;74 
It should be noted that in paragraph 16, the Security Council as-
serts Iraq’s responsibility to individuals and corporations as well as to 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of International Judicial Institutions, 44 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 848, 859 (1995). 
 70. Hulbert, supra note 44, at 501. 
 71. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Members, supra note 49. 
 72. Introduction, UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION, at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/ 
introduc.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2004). 
 73. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st meeting, at para. 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), 
available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res0687.pdf. 
 74. Id. at para 18. 
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governments.  The UNCC’s commitment to non-state actors and its 
focus on the individual was then confirmed in the Commission’s very 
first decision which gave precedence, not to the claims of corpora-
tions and governments, but rather to the processing of claims by indi-
viduals not exceeding $100,000.75  Furthermore, individual claimants 
at the UNCC have an elevated level of autonomy and responsibility 
because they select the type of claim they desire to file themselves, in-
stead of the more common approach of the claims facility deciding on 
the category of each claim.76  In fact, one author has called the privi-
leged position of the individual claimant in the UNCC system “as 
possibly the most significant contribution of the UNCC to the devel-
opment of international law in the field of claims settlement.”77 
Despite the strong focus on individuals, the UNCC does not fit 
the classic reparations mold exactly.  “Under the traditional repara-
tions model . . . there is a fixed amount of money in a closed-end fund 
that is administered and allocated by a single nationality.  Here the 
fund is open-ended and administered and allocated by an interna-
tional organization.”78  Also, as will be discussed below, although 
there are numerous similarities between the UNCC and the arbitral 
model, the UNCC is not a classic arbitration either.  “With traditional 
arbitration . . . the amount of monies available is typically not re-
stricted and the affected parties participate in the allocation decision-
making, albeit with international arbitrators.  The UNCC, however, 
does not contemplate an adversarial process to determine the total 
amount of monies to be awarded.”79  Neither a pure claims reparation 
tribunal nor a pure arbitration, the structure of the UNCC is rather 
unique. 
With Resolution 692 of May 20, 1991, the U.N. Security Council 
approved the UNCC in accordance with the configuration set out in 
the U.N. Secretary-General’s report of May 2, 1991.80  In this report, 
the Secretary-General specified that 
 
 75. Andrea Gattini, The UN Compensation Commission: Old Rules, New Procedures on 
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[t]he principal organ of the Commission will be a 15-member Gov-
erning Council composed of the representatives of the current 
members of the Security Council at any given time.  The Governing 
Council will be assisted by a number of commissioners who will 
perform the tasks assigned to them by the Governing Council.81 
As a result, the Commission is a bifurcated organ: the Governing 
Council stands as the policy-making arm and the commissioners are 
the judicial decision-makers.82  In this report however, the Secretary-
General made it clear that that the Commission was not a judicial 
body in the same manner as the Iran-U.S. Tribunal. 
The Commission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before which 
the parties appear; it is a political organ that performs an essentially 
fact-finding function of examining claims, verifying their validity, 
evaluating losses, assessing payments and resolving disputed claims.  
It is only in this last respect that a quasi-judicial function may be in-
volved.83 
Despite this, many similarities exist between the UNCC’s commis-
sioners, the Iran-U.S. Tribunal’s judges and arbitrators in a traditional 
arbitration proceeding. 
Structurally, the UNCC mirrors the familiar construction of the 
Iran-U.S. Tribunal.  As in the Tribunal, the UNCC’s commissioners 
work in panels of three, and each of the members must be of a differ-
ent nationality.84  The composition of each panel is determined by the 
Governing Council who assigns each panel a specific category or sub-
category of claims.85 
The commissioners here are not appointed by government par-
ties though.  Instead, they are nominated by the Secretary-General 
and placed on a Register of Experts.86  Once approved, the commis-
 
Geneva and that the Governing Council may decide whether some of the activities of the 
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sioners are then appointed from this Register by the Governing 
Council as needed to form panels to review claims.87 
From the beginning, the duties assigned to the commissioners 
made it clear that they were expected to fill the role of judicial deci-
sion-makers.  The Secretary-General’s report of May 1991 specified 
that, given the bifurcated nature of the Commission, “it is all the 
more important that some element of due process be built into the 
procedure.  It will be the function of the commissioners to provide 
this element.”88  The commissioners were to ensure that certain levels 
of judicial norms like fairness and justice persisted in the processing 
of claims at the UNCC. 
Additionally, the procedures followed by the commissioners are 
similar to those of arbitrators.  The commissioners meet in panels to 
deliberate once they’ve examined claims.89  The panel must determine 
the “admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence 
submitted.”90  A panel may also request further written submissions, 
invite testimony through oral proceedings, or call for additional in-
formation from any other source, including expert advice.91  A major-
ity of the commissioners must concur in any recommendations or de-
cisions.92 
The actual processing of claims is done in various stages.  First, 
the commissioners verify and evaluate the losses claimed.93  In doing 
this, the commissioners must determine whether the claims are di-
rectly related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.94  The resolution of any 
disputed claims is arguably the commissioners’ most judicial func-
tion.95  Once the commissioners assess the value of losses suffered by 
the claimants, they make recommendations for compensation, with 
brief explanations, in written reports submitted to the Governing 
Council.96 
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 88. Report 22559, supra note 81, at 7. 
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 91. Id. at art. 36. 
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 93. Report 22559, supra note 81, at 8–9. 
 94. The Commissioners, supra note 85. 
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Interestingly though, the Governing Council still has quite a bit 
of influence over the process.  The guidelines used by the commis-
sioners in verifying and resolving claims were established by the Gov-
erning Council at the outset.97  Also, once the commissioners have 
made their recommendations, it is the Governing Council who makes 
the final determination on the compensation awarded.98  Despite this 
ultimate position of review, the Governing Council has approved all 
of the panels’ recommendations submitted to it to date.99  So it is the 
commissioners’ influence which pervades the UNCC’s legacy and it is 
these individuals, similar to the Iran-U.S. Tribunal’s judges, who have 
been crafting the UNCC’s contribution to international law. 
As individuals, both arbitrators and the UNCC’s commissioners 
are a representation of the international law elite.  The professional 
qualifications, experience, and integrity of the commissioners played 
a key role in their nominations.100  “Commissioners are chosen for 
their integrity, experience and expertise in such areas as law, account-
ing, loss adjustment, assessment of environmental damage, and engi-
neering.  They are international jurists and other professionals with 
an established international reputation.”101  The commissioners’ supe-
rior characteristics parallel those of the international arbitration 
community.  “Only a very select and elite group of individuals is able 
to serve as international arbitrators.  They are purportedly selected 
for their ‘virtue’—judgment, neutrality [and] expertise.”102 
In addition to the panel structure noted above and the commis-
sioners’ qualifications, the arbitral model again arises in the commis-
sioners’ impartiality requirements.  When a commissioner is nomi-
nated, he must disclose any relationships which would give rise to 
justifiable doubts about his impartiality or independence.103  Once ap-
pointed, commissioners have a duty to disclose any new circum-
 
 97. Report 22559, supra note 81, at 7.  In addition, the commissioners apply other relevant 
rules of law as set out in Article 31 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure: “In consider-
ing the claims, Commissioners will apply Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and other rele-
vant Security Council resolutions, the criteria established by the Governing Council for particu-
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sional Rules, supra note 84, at art. 31. 
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stances that might affect the impartial nature of their judgments.104  
Commissioners cannot have financial interests in any of the claims 
submitted to them, and they cannot have or be associated with finan-
cial interests in corporations whose claims have been submitted to 
them.105  Additionally, during a commissioner’s service, and for two 
years following the termination of that service, a commissioner can-
not represent or advise any party or claimant in preparing or present-
ing their claims to the Commission.106  Finally, every commissioner 
must deliver a signed declaration to the Executive Secretary that 
reads, “I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and exercise 
my position as Commissioner honourably, faithfully, independently, 
impartially and conscientiously.”107 
The high-quality work which issued from the Commission is par-
tially a result of this faithful neutrality. 
Taking a broad overview of the jurisprudence of the panels of 
commissioners, it can be seen that the commissioners are not only 
exemplary in their fairness and impartiality – as one would expect, 
given the level of professionalism and scholarship shared by most 
commissioners – but that their work is a significant contribution to 
the clarification and development of various rules of international 
law on claims settlement.108 
Not every aspect of the UNCC is held in such high regard though. 
Criticism abounds, and it begins with the Commission’s very 
foundation.  “Since its inception, the legitimacy of the United Nations 
Compensation Commission (UNCC) has been controversial, particu-
larly the Security Council’s competence to establish it.”109  Despite 
Iraq’s formal acceptance of Security Council Resolution 687, to all in-
tents and purposes, it was imposed.110  One former judge of the Iran-
U.S. Tribunal describes the one-sided nature of the Commission’s es-
tablishment: 
The UNCC [was] . . . unilaterally established by the United Nations 
Security Council specifically to deal with a Member State that had 
just lost a war prosecuted by a Coalition of other Member States 
under authority of a Security Council Resolution. . . . Iraq has had 
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 107. Id. at art. 27. 
 108. Gattini, supra note 75, at 178. 
 109. Id. at 161 (italics omitted) 
 110. Brower, supra note 32, at 16. 
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somewhere between little and no voice in the affairs of the 
UNCC.111 
Iraq’s lack of participation in the UNCC stands in stark contrast 
to Iran’s involvement in the establishment of the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal.  Iran had a co-equal role with the United States in every as-
pect of the Tribunal’s operations on a continuous basis.112  The Tribu-
nal therefore reflects the sovereign equality of the two parties who es-
tablished it, as opposed to the UNCC which was operated almost 
entirely without input from the state most closely affected by it.113 
The lack of political will from Iraq had serious consequences on 
the Commission’s initial effectiveness and success.  Here again, an 
important comparison can be drawn between the Commission and 
the Iran-U.S. Tribunal, particularly in the cooperation of Iran and 
Iraq in financing each of the compensation funds.  The fund of the 
Tribunal was financed in part out of the Iranian financial assets fro-
zen in foreign countries, and overall, Iran was cooperative in making 
this happen.114  “The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal arguably exists be-
cause Iran calculated that the political costs of not cooperating were 
far outweighed by the benefits of unfreezing Iranian assets and termi-
nating U.S. court litigation.”115  In the Commission however, Security 
Council Resolution 705 (1991) stated that the UNCC’s compensation 
fund was to be financed with a percentage of the revenues from Iraq’s 
oil exports.116  “[T]he coercive model of placing the Iraqi oil industry 
under UN receivership and skimming off 30 percent of the oil reve-
nues was wholly ineffective for many years because Saddam Hussein 
simply refused to pump oil.”117 
Because Iraq did not agree to have its oil exports controlled by 
the United Nations, the system did not work initially.118  “This shows 
that political will is essential to the successful establishment of new 
judicial institutions.”119  Additionally, the reality of the lack of benefits 
in this situation for Iraq cannot be overlooked.  “[T]hose tribunals es-
tablished under a rationalist theory have been among the most effec-
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tive.  Iran is still participating in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in part 
because it is a claimant in a multibillion dollar military dispute with 
the United States.”120  With nothing to gain, it is hardly surprising that 
Iraq was much less cooperative in participating in a mechanism that 
would take away thirty percent of its oil proceeds to pay off those 
with claims against it. 
As further proof of the commissioners’ professionalism and 
equal-handedness, they developed several responses to compensate 
for Iraq’s lack of standing in the Commission.  First, they scrutinized 
the claims against Iraq very closely.121  “This is a natural consequence 
of the fact that the defendant is absent and therefore has to no one to 
defend its interests other than the commissioners themselves, who in-
evitably will take on the task to a degree.”122  Any natural skepticism 
that the commissioners might have had in a particular claim was going 
to be slightly amplified simply because the commissioners had to 
compensate for the absent voice of defense counsel. 
Other procedural aspects of the Commission’s work helped to 
guard against any due process violations stemming from Iraq’s un-
equal role.  Article 16 of the UNCC’s Provisional Rules requires pe-
riodic reports to be issued to the Governing Council concerning the 
claims received by the Executive Secretary.123  In addition to informa-
tion about the parties who submitted the claims, the categories of the 
claims, the number of claimants, and the amount of requested com-
pensation, the reports may also contain “significant legal and factual 
issues raised by the claims.”124  These reports must then be circulated 
to Iraq125 who has either 30 or 90 days, depending on the type of 
claim, in which to present “additional information and views concern-
ing the report to the Executive Secretary for transmission to panels of 
Commissioners.”126  These submissions are Iraq’s only institutional-
ized pathway to take cognizance of the claims submitted and to coop-
erate with the panels of commissioners.127 
The individual panels then have discretion as to how involved 
Iraq will be in the processing of any given group of claims.  Article 
 
 120. Alford, supra note 4, at 164. 
 121. Brower, supra note 32, at 22. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Provisional Rules, supra note 84, at art. 16(1). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at art. 16(2). 
 126. Id. at art. 16(3). 
 127. Gattini, supra note 75, at 168. 
BODACK1.DOC 9/15/2005  10:06 AM 
382 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 15:363 
35(3) of the Provisional Rules requires that claims by corporations, 
governments, international organizations and other entities “be sup-
ported by documentary and other appropriate evidence sufficient to 
demonstrate the circumstances and amount of the claimed loss.”128  
Panels can then exercise their rights under Article 36 of the Provi-
sional Rules to request additional evidence in unusually large or 
complex cases.129 
It is thanks to these procedural devices that the panels of commis-
sioners can establish a solid link with the Iraqi Government. So far, 
all panels entrusted with the settlement of unusually large or com-
plex cases have availed themselves of the opportunity of asking 
Iraq to express its views in written form, and have taken those 
views into account even when they arrived late.130 
Additionally, panels have even granted Iraqi requests for oral pro-
ceedings in which Iraq could present testimony.131 
A final criticism concerns the fact that the Governing Council is 
simply the Security Council’s “alter ego.”132  Despite the accusation 
that this set-up allows the Security Council to act “as law-maker, 
prosecutor and judge” all at the same time, this view is untenable.133  
“[T]he UNCC decides as a rule by majority voting without the possi-
bility of a veto, and . . . only decisions relating to questions of meas-
ures to ensure Iraqi payments into the Fund are taken by consen-
sus . . . .”134 
While it is clear that the Commission’s main weakness is Iraq’s 
lack of involvement, this one-sided nature of the Commission con-
tributes directly to its greatest strengths.  Because the UNCC was 
created unilaterally, as opposed to the dual involvement of the 
United States and Iran in the Tribunal, “substantial justice can be 
done and done with comparative swiftness at the Commission as re-
gards the multitude of individual claimants.”135  The lack of govern-
ment influence in the UNCC also means that business and govern-
mental claimants are less well off than they were at the Tribunal, 
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which contributes to the strong position of individual claimants at the 
Commission.136 
Also, the “small town syndrome,”137 which occurred at the Tribu-
nal, was absent at the Commission. 
This entire phenomenon does not arise, however, at least not in the 
same degree, where people are working together on one assign-
ment alone and thereafter will be disbanded.  Thus the lack of a 
standing body of decisional personnel at the UNCC, added to 
Iraq’s non-participation in its proceedings and its consequent in-
ability to project political events into them, means that decisions 
consistently can be made in the freest possible atmosphere.138 
Because panels of commissioners are only appointed for limited peri-
ods of time to handle one group or category of claims, the Commis-
sion has a stronger sense of impartiality than the Tribunal. 
As a whole, the Commission can be judged as a success.139  De-
spite the initial problems in payment, in December 1996, the “oil-for-
food” scheme set out in Security Council Resolution 986 (1995), 
which allowed the Commission to receive thirty percent of the pro-
ceeds of Iraq’s oil sales, was finally launched.140  This allowed the 
Commission to continue its operations and to finally make regular 
compensation payments to successful claimants.141  By December 
2004, out of over 2.6 million claims filed with the Commission, all but 
25,000 had been resolved.142  Over $18.8 billion was paid out in com-
pensation to victims of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.143 
The commissioners also deserve credit for rising to the challenge 
to decide some incredibly difficult issues that came up at the Commis-
sion.  For example, the panels had to make decisions concerning the 
assessment of damages for mental pain and anguish.144  “The commis-
sioners sought assistance where appropriate from a group of experts 
in psychiatry, psychology, medicine and war medicine, but in the end 
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it was the commissioners who made the often very difficult decisions 
on causality.”145 
Even with all the criticisms, the UNCC and its commissioners de-
serve high praise. 
Although some of its procedural and substantial aspects might be 
open to criticism, the work hitherto accomplished by the various 
UNCC panels shows a very high standard of legal skill and fairness, 
and has contributed significantly to the clarification and develop-
ment of various international law rules on claims settlement.146 
The high-quality work of the Commission is a direct effect of the su-
perior characteristics of the commissioners, just as the Iran-U.S. Tri-
bunal owes much of its success to its judges.  As of March 2005, fifty-
nine commissioners had been appointed, representing forty different 
nationalities.147  It is thanks to these individuals that the UNCC con-
tributed in such a sophisticated and professional manner to the devel-
opment of international law. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Iran-U.S. Tribunal and the UNCC are both models of the 
successful adjudication of disputes involving non-state actors in inter-
national law forums.  Additionally, they have both borrowed exten-
sively from the arbitral model, which has contributed some of their 
strongest features.  Because there is no reason to doubt the continua-
tion of the establishment of ad hoc tribunals to deal with forthcoming 
international disputes, these future judicial bodies would benefit from 
adopting some of these proven successful characteristics. 
Though these international claims tribunals are unique in their 
structures, the combination of elements drawn from the arbitral and 
judicial models has proved to be an effective framework. 
[M]odern Mass Claims Processes have been a valuable way to de-
fuse diplomatic crises, a useful adjunct to concluding peace treaties, 
as well as a means of providing compensation for historic wrongs. 
They offer us the challenging opportunity to consider whether 
some of the innovations they have pioneered would be useful in 
making resolution of single cases in international commercial arbi-
tration quicker and more efficient.148 
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The Iran-U.S. Tribunal’s strongest attribute is that its effective 
involvement of both state parties legitimized both the overall process 
and the results coming from the Tribunal.  Each party’s contribution 
was an illustration of political will in the dispute resolution process.  
This was decidedly absent in the UNCC where Iraq had almost no 
role whatsoever.  If future judicial forums can involve the parties in 
the set-up and operations, there is a greater chance of legitimization. 
On the other hand, the UNCC was remarkably effective in creat-
ing a free atmosphere of true impartiality by choosing a different 
group of three commissioners for every group of claims.  The “small 
town syndrome,” which was problematic at the Iran-U.S. Tribunal, 
did not occur at the UNCC.  Future forums would benefit from 
adopting a method to avoid any obstacles to impartiality. 
Finally, it is remarkable that these institutions each used aspects 
of the arbitral model.  The establishment of panels to decide claims 
and the choice of select individuals as judicial decision makers, two of 
arbitration’s most characteristic features, appear in both contexts.  By 
using arbitral elements, “the undoubted value of honest and neutral 
decisions that international arbitration can provide may be brought 
effectively to bear on . . . important questions.”149  Integrating arbitral 
features into a judicial body adds an immediately recognizable di-
mension of neutrality. 
One hundred years after the establishment of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, international courts, tribunals, and commissions 
have become an integral means for the peaceful settlement of interna-
tional disputes.150  Though these judicial institutions vary widely in 
their mandates, structures, and effectiveness, future international dis-
pute settlement mechanisms would benefit from incorporating their 
proven successful characteristics. 
 
 149. Hulbert, supra note 44, at 505–06. 
 150. Alford, supra note 4, at 165. 
